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In most developed countries, economies are facing population ageing, falling fertility 
rates and stagnating labour force participation. The ability of governments to fund future 
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security receipts from workers. Policymakers are generally in agreement that increasing 
the labour force participation of women, without reducing the fertility rate, is needed. In 
the year 2000, with the aim of increasing women’s labour market participation, a partial 
individualisation of the Irish income tax system was initiated. Using the Living in Ireland 
survey and a difference-in-differences framework, I investigate whether this reform had any 
effect on female labour supply and caring duties. I find that the labour force participation 
rate of married women increased by 5-6 percentage points in the wake of the reform, 
hours of work increased by two per week and hours of unpaid childcare decreased by 
approximately the same margin. 
JEL Classification: J08, J20, H31
Keywords: individual taxation, labour supply, Ireland
Corresponding author:
Karina Doorley
The Economic and Social Research Institute
Whitaker Square
Sir John Rogerson’s Quay
Dublin 2
Ireland
E-mail: karina.doorley@esri.ie
* I am grateful to Tim Callan, Claire Keane, Barra Roantree and participants of the Statistical and Social Enquiry of 
Ireland Barrington Lectures for helpful comments and suggestions.
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The importance of removing barriers to work for all those who are willing and able to work is 
fast becoming a policy objective for governments. In most developed countries, economies 
are facing population ageing, falling fertility rates and stagnating labour force participation. 
The ability of governments to fund future pension and health-care expenditure relies to a 
large extent on income tax and social security receipts from workers. Research by Dolls et al 
(2017) has shown that projected demographic change over the next two decades will lead to 
fiscal stress in most European countries, including Ireland. Among other measures, 
policymakers are generally in agreement that an examination of which policy instruments to 
use to increase the labour force participation of women, without reducing the fertility rate, is 
needed.  
 
The female employment rate in Ireland is 64%. This places Ireland somewhere around the 
EU median. Sweden, for example, has a female employment rate close to 80%. At the other 
end of the spectrum, southern European countries such as Greece and Italy have female 
employment rates around 50%. Although the gender pay gap has been improving, men still 
earn approximately one-sixth more than women in Ireland. Gender inequality persists in 
retirement as elderly men also have higher income than elderly women.1 This is at least partly 
due to lower pension entitlements of women who have, on average, shorter and less well-paid 
careers.  
 
Over the last few decades, the general trend in European Union countries has been a move 
from joint towards individual taxation. However, joint taxation is still present in the US as 
well as a handful of EU countries, including Ireland. Also, many countries with 
“individualised” taxation still retain some elements of joint taxation. In 2000, with the aim of 
increasing women’s labour market participation, a plan to phase in individual income 
taxation for couples in Ireland was put forward. It met with considerable opposition as it was 
considered to penalise women who chose to stay at home in a caring role. The proposal was 
shelved and a somewhat hybrid system was introduced between 2000 and 2002, and remains 
in place to this day. 
 
A shift from this hybrid system to full individual taxation, which would equalise the marginal 
tax rates of the primary and secondary earner, is a potential policy route to take from the 
perspective of increasing female labour supply and reducing gender disparities in the burden 
of household production in Ireland. A move by the Irish government to introduce individual 
taxation would also be in line with a new initiative by the European Commission, the Work-
Life Balance Package, which combines legal and policy measures, including removing fiscal 
disincentives for secondary earners, to support the work-life balance. Apart from its potential 
incentive effects on the labour supply of women, there are broader societal benefits of 
individualised taxation systems and the dual-earner, dual-carer model. By removing barriers 
to women’s employment, the interrelated issues of the gender wage and earning gap and the 
gender pension gap are partially addressed. Women’s increased economic independence can 
also reduce female poverty (Findlay & Wright, 1996) and reduce the risk of victimisation and 
violence (Bowlus & Seitz, 2006). 
 
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, I document the historical 
shift in female labour market attachment in Ireland over the last couple of decades and show 
how the partial individualisation of the income tax system in 2000 changed financial 
                                                            
1 Figures from Eurostat, 2016. Employment figures for 20-64 year olds.  
3 
 
incentives to work for married women. Using the Living in Ireland (LII) survey in a 
Difference-in-Differences framework, I then investigate whether the partial individualisation 
of the Irish income taxation system which began in 2000 had any effect on female labour 
supply or related outcomes, such as the time spent caring for children. These results will then 
be discussed in the context of a hypothetical, fully individualised income taxation system for 
Ireland and policy conclusions will be drawn.  
2. Related literature 
The literature indicates that income tax influences the decision of individuals to work. Joint 
income taxation, which splits or aggregates the income of a couple in determining the income 
tax liability, is a feature of the Irish tax-benefit system and one which imposes higher 
marginal tax rates on the lower or secondary earner in a couple, which is usually the woman. 
This is because the primary earner can use the secondary earners tax allowances, credits and 
bands so that, typically, if a secondary earner joins the labour market, they pay higher 
average and marginal rates of taxation than if they were unmarried. This means that 
secondary earners in Ireland have less financial incentive than their European counterparts to 
either join the labour market or to increase their hours of work if they are already working 
part-time.  
 
One of the groups most responsive to changes in income tax is women, particularly those 
with children (Blundell, 2014).2 Bargain et al (2013) estimate that the labour supply elasticity 
of married women in Ireland, which measures how much extra labour is provided in response 
to an increased financial return to that labour, is around 0.4 (almost twice the EU average), 
compared to 0.2 for married men. Given the relatively high responsiveness of female labour 
supply to financial incentives in Ireland, it seems counterintuitive for the Irish taxation model 
to impose higher marginal tax rates on women. The disincentives for labour force 
participation become particularly apparent if we compare market work (yielding highly taxed 
earned income) with non-market work in the household (yielding household goods which are 
not burdened by any tax). It is not surprising, therefore, that many women substitute their 
market work by non-market work, taking advantage of the favourable tax treatment of 
household good production (Kabátek et al, 2014).  
 
Recent work by Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln (2017), which studies the US and 17 EU 
countries, finds large disincentive effects of joint taxation on the hours worked of married 
women. At individual country level, previous empirical research has also evaluated the ex-
ante labour market effect of a proposed shift from joint to individual taxation in Ireland 
(Callan et al, 2009), France (Kabátek et al, 2014), Germany (Decoster and Haan, 2011) and 
Luxembourg (Doorley, 2016), finding that the participation rate of married women can be 
expected to increase by around 1-9%. There have also been studies which have evaluated the 
incentive effects of individual taxation in a natural experiment framework in the UK 
(Roantree, 2018); the US (Lalumia, 2008); Sweden (Selin, 2014) and Canada (Crossley and 
Jeon, 2007). In each case, individual taxation is found to result in substantially higher labour 
market participation by women.  
                                                            
2 The young and the old are also particularly responsive to fiscal incentives 
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3. Background 
3.1 Gender differences in labour market behaviour in Ireland 
The activity and employment rates of Irish women have been rising over the last couple of 
decades but remain low compared to our European counterparts. In 2016, around 64% of 
Irish women were employed, compared to 77% of Irish men. Comparable figures from the 
UK were 72% (women) and 83% (men) and from the EU-28 were 65% (women) and 77% 
(men).3 The average hours of work of Irish women is similar to that of women in the UK 
(around 32 hours per week) but less than that of women in the EU as a whole (around 34 
hours per week). The result of these discrepancies is that Irish women are less likely to have 
market income and, for those women who do receive market income, they receive less.  
 
Seemingly in contrast to these facts, the raw Irish gender pay gap, measured as the percentage 
difference between average male and female earnings is relatively low, at around 14% in 
2014, compared to 21% in the UK and the EU average of 16%. However, interpretation of 
this result requires some nuance. Because Irish female labour force participation is low, it is 
comprised of a relatively better educated female workforce compared to countries with higher 
labour force participation. An adjusted measure of the gender wage gap, which accounts for 
the characteristics of the population, puts the Irish gender wage gap closer to 17% and the 
UK gender wage gap at around 12% (Christofides et al, 2013). 
 
Table 1 Selected labour market statistics for Ireland, the UK and the EU-28 
        
IE UK EU 
        
Labour Force Participation Rate of women 0.64 0.72 0.65 
Incidence of Full-time work 0.70 0.61 0.70 
Incidence of part-time work 0.30 0.39 0.30 
Average weekly hours of work 32 32 34 
Unadjusted gender pay gap 14 21 17 
Adjusted gender pay gap 17 12 - 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) of 
secondary earners with young children 43 33 33 
Female/male income ratio of elderly 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Labour supply elasticities of married 
women  0.40 0.11 0.27 
        
METR for 2012 taken from Rastrigina & Verashchagina (2015). Adjusted gender pay 
gap comes from Christofides et al (2013). Labour supply elasticities for 1998-2005 
period from Bargain et al (2013). Unadjusted gender pay gap for 2014 from Eurostat. 
All other statistics for 2016 from Eurostat. 
 
                                                            
3 Pre-crisis figures from 2007 tell a similar story. The employment rate of women in Ireland (65%) was lower 
than that of women in the UK (68%) but slightly higher than the EU-28 average (63%) while male employment 
rates were comparable at 83% in Ireland, 82% in the UK and 78% in the EU.  
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3.2 Barriers to secondary work in Ireland 
The historical role of women in Irish society and the Irish labour market is likely to be at least 
partly responsible for the relatively low attachment of Irish women to the labour force today.4 
The 1937 Constitution of the Republic of Ireland provided a legal basis for excluding women 
from the labour market and confining them to the home. The marriage bar of 1932, which 
prevented married women from working in the civil service, was not repealed until 1973. By 
contrast, in the UK, attention was given relatively early to the issue of equality in the labour 
market as, during the two World Wars, women took up typically male jobs. The British 
marriage bar was lifted in 1944, decades earlier than the Irish marriage bar. The Equal Pay 
Act of 1970 legislated for equal pay and conditions for men and women in the UK. The 
European Union drove the implementation of equality legislation in Ireland in 1974 (Anti-
Discrimination (Pay) Act and 1998 (the Employment Equality Act 1998). 
 
Low financial incentives to work discourage women, in particular, from working or from 
working full-time. Typically, these financial incentives fall under two headings: the payoff 
from going to work (labour income minus taxation minus withdrawn benefits) and the fixed 
costs of going to work (the cost of childcare, of care of elderly relatives, commuting costs, 
etc.). This paper focuses on the former incentive, that is, the financial return to working 
through earnings and the tax and benefit system. The disincentives stemming from fixed costs 
of work will be discussed in the concluding section.  
 
The incentive to work is often measured using the Participation Tax Rate (PTR) and the 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR). The PTR measures the proportion of additional 
earnings that is paid over when a person joins the labour force due to the increase in taxes or 
benefit withdrawal. The average Irish PTR for female entrants to the labour market was 
estimated to be 14-35 per cent in 2012 (Rastrigina & Verashchagina, 2015). These figures are 
comparable to the corresponding range of 15 – 25 per cent in the UK.5 However, once out-of-
pocket childcare costs, one of the fixed costs of work which act as an implicit tax for women 
with children, are taken into account in this measurement, the Irish female PTR can reach 
94%, the second highest in the EU, behind the UK at 120%.6  
 
The METR, which captures the amount of each euro of additional earnings that would have 
to be paid over in tax, social security contributions or in forgone benefits is also used to 
measure financial incentives to work. The average METR of female secondary earners is 
higher in Ireland, at 40%, than in most other European countries. In addition, 36% of female 
secondary earners faced METRs above 50% in 2012. This is the second highest proportion in 
the EU. By comparison, the UK has an average METR of 30% for female secondary earners 
and just 5% of British female secondary earners face a METR above 50% (Rastrigina & 
Verashchagina, 2015).  
 
3.3 Partial individualisation of income tax 2000-2002  
There are two commonly used systems for the joint taxation of couples. Aggregation 
combines the incomes of the two spouses and taxes the total income according to the same 
rates and bands as single individuals. This system financially penalises marriage and is 
                                                            
4 See Russell et al (2017) for a comprehensive overview of how gender equality in the Irish labour market has 
evolved over the last 50 years. 
5 Callan et al (2016) estimate PTRs for all out-of-work individuals rather than just women and also find that 
these are generally higher in Ireland than the UK  
6 It should be kept in mind that secondary earners who choose not to join the labour market may be constrained 
by caring duties for elderly relatives as well as for children. 
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usually accompanied by a couple’s allowance or tax credit. Income splitting adds the incomes 
of spouses but then splits the total so that each spouse is taxed as if they had earned half of 
the total income. This system financially rewards marriage by allowing full transferability of 
rates and bands. Between 1980 and 1999, Ireland operated a system of income splitting, 
whereby married couples could reduce their tax bill compared to cohabiting couples by 
sharing allowances and rate bands between partners.  
 
Before the income tax reform in 2000, the taxation system in Ireland was structured as 
follows (see also Table 2). There were two tax bands. Up to €17,800, taxation was applied at 
24%. Any additional income was taxed at 46%. There was an annual personal tax credit of 
€5,333, allowable at the standard rate of taxation. There was also an employee tax credit of 
€1,270, allowable at the standard rate of taxation. The tax system provided an option for 
married couples living together to be jointly assessed with double the entitlements of a single 
person. This meant that the standard tax band was €35,600 for a married couple (double the 
amount for a single person) and the annual tax credit was €10,666. Only the employee tax 
credit was individual so that a married couple with one earner could only benefit from it 
once. The majority of married couples opted for joint taxation as, because of the 
transferability of reliefs between them, it was more advantageous to them than treatment as 
two single persons.  
 
On December 1st 1999, the Minister for Finance announced the “radical change of moving to 
individualisation of the standard rate band over this and the next two Budgets.” Between 
1999 and 2000, the standard rate bands for a single person and a two earner couple were 
increased by 21% with no corresponding increase in the standard rate band for one-earner 
couples. In nominal terms, the situation of one earner couples was unchanged. However, in 
real terms, their standard rate band was frozen at its pre-reform level while those of singles 
and two-earner couples increased. The opportunity cost of remaining a one-earner couple 
rather than a two-earner couple therefore increased.7  
 
In 2001, the standard rate bands for single individuals and two-earner couples were increased 
by a further 15% more than the standard rate band for one earner couples. A final reform in 
this direction took place in 2002 when the standard rate bands for singles and two-earner 
couples were increased by 10% more than the standard rate band for one earner couples. The 
result of this was that Ireland went from a system of 100% transferability of the standard rate 
band in 1999 to 65% transferability in 2000, 45% transferability in 2001 and 32% 
transferability in 2002. This ratio has remained relatively stable since 2002. 
 
Other taxation reforms accompanied this partial individualisation of the standard rate band in 
2000. The personal tax credit was increased by €635 (£500) for singles and €1,270 (£1,000) 
for married couples. This tax credit was still fully transferable between spouses and allowable 
only at the standard rate of taxation. Furthermore, the standard rate of taxation was reduced 
from 24% to 22% while the top rate of taxation was reduced from 46% to 44%.  
 
  
                                                            
7 In response to public pressure, the government also introduced a Home Carer’s tax credit of €840. Its value 
was £3,000, allowable at the standard rate of taxation in 2000 of 22%. A couple whose combined taxable 
income exceeded the standard rate band for a one earner married couple could opt for either the Home Carers 
Allowance or the extra standard rate band 
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Table 2 Major changes to the Irish taxation system between 1999 and 2002 
          
1999 2000 2001 2002 
          
Standard tax rate 24% 22% 20% 20% 
Top tax rate 46% 44% 42% 42% 
Standard rate band for singles 17,800 21,600 25,395 28,000 
Standard rate band for one earner couples 35,600 35,600 36,822 37,000 
Standard rate band for two earner couples 35,600 43,200 50,790 56,000 
Personal tax credit (standard rate) -transferable 1,280 1,313 1,397 1,520 
Employee tax credit (standard rate) - non-
transferable 305 279 508 660 
          
Source: www.revenue.ie and budget.gov.ie. Monetary values in €
 
The effect of this move towards individualisation of the tax-benefit system can be visualised 
by estimating the METR and the PTR of the secondary earner before and after the reform. In 
addition to showing these schedules for the 1999 and 2000 taxation systems, I define one 
counterfactual system for 1999. This is simply the baseline 1999 system with the addition of 
partial individualisation of the standard rate band. Comparing the 1999 baseline system to 
this counterfactual 1999 system, as well as to the 2000 system, will give an idea of how the 
magnitude of changes observed between 1999 and 2000 is split between individualisation of 
the standard rate band and other reforms such as the reduction in the taxation rate and the 
increase in the personal tax credit. 
 
I take an example of a household in which the primary earner (likely to be the husband) earns 
the median potential male wage in 1999 of €12.38 per hour and works 40 hours per week (i.e. 
a gross income of €25,750 per year). The secondary earner (likely the wife) can earn €8.42 
per hour, the median potential female wage in 1999 and can work 0-40 hours per week.8  
 
Figure 1 shows the marginal effective tax rate (METR) of the secondary earner in the three 
taxation regimes as she increases her weekly hours of work. Recall that the METR estimates 
the amount of each extra euro of gross earnings that is foregone through taxes or withdrawn 
benefits. In our example, there are no withdrawn benefits as the household is not eligible for 
anything apart from child benefit, which is universal. Social security contributions (PRSI) are 
not modelled for ease of interpretation. Therefore, the METR in Figure 1 depicts the 
proportion of additional earnings paid by the secondary earner through taxation.  In 1999 
(black line), the METR of the secondary earner in our example jumped almost immediately 
to 24%, i.e. the standard rate of taxation (once the employee tax credit was exhausted). The 
METR remains at this level until the secondary earner is working longer than 23 hours per 
week. At this point, the amount of each additional euro of earnings paid in taxation increases 
46%, i.e. the higher rate of taxation.  
 
 
                                                            
8 The modelling of hourly wages is discussed in the Appendix 
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Figure 1 Marginal effective tax rates of a secondary earner in Ireland in alternative tax-
benefit systems 
 
Note: Marginal effective tax rate of secondary earner in a simplified tax-benefit system in Ireland in 1999; in a 
counterfactual 1999 system with partial individualisation of the standard rate band and in 2000. Primary 
earner works 40 hours per week and earns the year-specific median male hourly wage. Secondary earner works 
0-40 hours per week and earns the year-specific median female hourly wage.  
In the hypothetical 1999 taxation system with partial individualisation of the standard band 
(gray line), the METR is identical to that in the baseline 1999 system until 23 hours of work. 
In the partially individualised system, the METR remains at 24% until close to 40 hours of 
work, rather than jumping to 46% when the secondary earner works longer than part-time. 
This is because the secondary earner has access to a non-transferable standard rate band in 
addition to the part of the joint standard rate band leftover from the primary earner.  The 
incentive for the secondary earner to work more is, therefore, larger than in the joint taxation 
system. 
 
The black dotted line shows the METR of the secondary earner in 2000 once partial 
individualisation has occurred and once the other changes to tax credits and rates (discussed 
in the previous section) have also taken place. The shape of the METR schedule for the 
secondary earner in 2000 is slightly lower (but otherwise similar) to that depicted in the 
hypothetical 1999 system due to the 2 percentage point decrease in the standard and higher 
rate of taxation.   
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Figure 2 Participation tax rates of a secondary earner in Ireland in alternative tax-
benefit systems 
 
Note: Participation tax rate of secondary earner in a simplified tax-benefit system in Ireland in 1999; in a 
counterfactual 1999 system with partial individualisation of the standard rate band and in 2000. Primary 
earner works 40 hours per week and earns the year-specific median male hourly wage. Secondary earner works 
0-40 hours per week and earns the year-specific median female hourly wage.  
Figure 2 shows the PTR of the secondary earner when they transition from 0-1; 0-2;…0-40 
hours of work. In 1999 this was 0 for very low hours of work (black line), as the secondary 
earner offsets their tax against their employee tax credit. Once this is exhausted, the PTR 
increases steadily until it reaches 20% around part-time work. It then begins to climb at an 
even steeper rate as the secondary earner begins to pay tax at the top rate.  
 
In the hypothetical 1999 system in which partial individualisation is introduced (gray line), 
the PTR follows the same path with the exception of the last steep rise. As the secondary 
earner in this system doesn’t hit the top rate of tax until they are close to full-time work, the 
PTR remains reasonably steady around 20-24% between part-time and full-time work.  
The PTR in 2000, depicted by the black dotted line lies slightly below the PTR in the 
individualised 1999 system due the simple fact that the standard rate band was also cut by 2 
percentage points in 2000. It rises steeply as the secondary earner approaches full-time work 
as, because median wages are higher in 2000 than in 1999, the secondary earner hits the top 
tax rate a little earlier in the 2000 system than in the individualised 1999 system. 
 
This analysis indicates that the incentive to work for the secondary increased substantially 
after the tax reforms enacted in 2000 and that individualisation of the standard rate band was 
the driving force behind this change.  
4. Data and Model 
In the next section, I show how this individual tax reform affected female labour supply and 
caring duties. To do this, I use the Living in Ireland Survey (LII), the Irish component of 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which ran from 1994 to 2001. LII 
provides harmonised cross-sectional surveys for each year in which the survey is conducted, 
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as well as longitudinal data. I use data from 1995-2001 in the analysis, that is, five years 
preceding the reform and two years after.9 Although full individualisation of the standard rate 
band was planned over three years (and was never fully completed), the announcement of 
full-individualisation of the standard rate band in December 1999 may have encouraged those 
affected by the reform to alter their behaviour immediately in anticipation of the full reform. 
It is therefore plausible that much of the behavioural effect triggered by the reform took place 
immediately after its announcement.  
 
To evaluate this, I compare outcomes for those affected by the reforms (the treatment group) 
to outcomes of those who are not affected by the reforms (the control group). In my baseline 
specification, the treatment group is composed of married women of working age (20-60 
years old). Prior to the reform, married women could transfer their entire standard rate band 
to their husband. Immediately after the 2000 reform, one-third of the standard rate band 
became non-transferable and, by 2002, two-thirds of the standard rate band was non-
transferable. This figure has remained relatively stable since then. 
 
A number of potential control groups are available. Single women, for whom the tax rules are 
unchanged after the reform, are an obvious choice. I also consider married men. It is possible 
that married men may also change their labour market behaviour in response to the reform. 
This could occur because their wage increases while their standard rate band remains fixed, 
leading to an increased average tax rate. They may also change their labour supply simply 
because their wives changed their own labour market behaviour. However, own and cross 
labour supply elasticities of married men are generally found to be close to zero (Bargain et 
al, 2014) so it is likely that any such effects will be minimal.    
 
I estimate a Difference-in-Differences model, which identifies the difference between the 
change in outcomes for married women after the reform and the change in outcomes for the 
control group after the reform (single women or married men). The general model is as 
follows: 
 
௜ܻ௧ = 	βଵ + βଶܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ +	βଷܲ݋ݏݐ௧ +	βସ(ܶݎ݁ܽݐ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ)௜௧ + 	δ ௜ܺ + γ ௧ܶ + ε	 (1) 
 
Where ௜ܻ௧ represents the outcome of interest for individual ݅ in year ݐ, ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ is a dummy 
variable equal to one in the post-reform period (2000 and 2001), ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ is a dummy variable 
which defines the treated group,  ௜ܺis a vector of observable characteristics (age, education 
level, number and age of children, predicted wage) and ௧ܶis a vector of year dummies.  
 
For validity, Difference-in-Differences models require that the pre-treatment trends of the 
treatment and control group are similar. I check and verify this graphically in the next 
section. They also require that no other policy or other change that differentially affects the 
treatment and control group occurs at the same time as the reform under investigation. This 
assumption will be discussed in more detail and some robustness checks will be performed in 
Section 6.  
 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for the pre-reform and post-reform 
period for men and women separately. The sample retained for analysis, which is also the 
                                                            
9 Data from 1994 is not used as childcare hours are not available in this wave of data. The LII survey was 
discontinued after 2001 and replaced by the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) in 2003 
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estimation sample used in the next section, is the working age population, defined as those 
aged between 20 and 60.  
5. The labour force effects of the move to individualisation 
5.1 Graphical results 
I first present a number of graphs which show the evolution of three outcomes of interest for 
the treatment group and two control groups. As discussed in Section 4, the treatment group is 
married women aged 20-60. The control groups are married men aged 20-60 and single 
women aged 20-60. Outcome variables are plotted over time for each group.  
 
Figure 3 The evolution of employment, hours of work and hours of unpaid childcare in 
Ireland between 1995 and 2001 
 
Source: own calculations based on 20-60 year-old population from Living in Ireland data 
The left-hand panel of Figure 3 shows how employment rates evolved between 1995 and 
2001. The employment rates of married men, single women and married women increased 
steadily and in a similar manner between 1995 and 1998. After this point, employment rates 
of single women and married women increased between 1998 and 1999. After 1999, the 
employment rates of married men and single women flattened out while the employment rate 
of married women continued to increase. This convergence between the employment rates of 
married women and the control groups coincided with the partial individualisation of the 
taxation system in the year 2000.  
 
The centre panel of Figure 3 shows the evolution of hours of work (including zeros) between 
1995 and 2001. Once again, the pre-reform trend in this measure for the two control groups is 
similar to that of the treatment group of married women. There was a steady increase in 
weekly hours of work in all samples but the strongest increase occurs for married women 
between 1999 and 2000.  
 
The right-hand panel of Figure 3 shows the evolution of the time spent caring for children 
without pay by the three groups. In this panel, I show only those with children. That is, 
married women, married men and single women without children are excluded. This ensures 
that the groups are more comparable in terms of their childcare hours. Even so, single women 
with children do not represent a good control group for evaluating the effect of the tax reform 
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on childcare hours. The trend in childcare hours for single women is noisy and dissimilar to 
the other two groups during the time period in question. Therefore, in what follows, we 
consider only married men with children as a control group to evaluate the effect of the tax 
reform on childcare. 
 
The number of hours spent caring for children is much higher for married women with 
children compared to married men with children. Married women spent an average of almost 
70 hours per week caring for children in 1995 and this figure remained stable over the years 
that followed. A small decrease is observed in 1999 and another in 2000. The number of 
hours that married men spent caring for children was stable during this time period at around 
12 per week.  There is, therefore, some convergence in the figures for men and women 
around the years 1999-2000.  
 
Overall, Figure 3 shows suggestive evidence that married women were more likely to work 
or to work more after the partial individualisation of the taxation system. Married men and, in 
particular, single women appear to be good control groups for a Difference-in-Differences 
style analysis of labour supply behaviour as the pre-reform trends in employment and hours 
of work are similar for all three groups. Evaluating the effect of the tax reform on hours of 
childcare will rely on estimating Difference-in-Differences between married women with 
children and married men with children as the group of single women with children does not 
appear to be a good control group.  
 
5.2 Difference-in-Differences results 
This section presents the baseline results from a Difference-in-Differences model for the 
three outcomes of interest: employment; hours of work and hours of unpaid childcare for 
those with children. I use two control groups in the main analysis and a further set of 
treatment and control groups will be identified and tested in a sensitivity analysis in the next 
section. 
 
Starting with employment outcomes, I estimate equation 1 using a linear probability model 
with robust standard errors.10 Column (1) in Table 3 shows estimates for equation 1 without 
additional controls or a time trend. In column (2), I add individual level controls (age, age 
squared, post-secondary qualification, no. of children, any children under 12 and predicted 
wage) and, in column (3), I add a time trend. The “treatment effect” identified in Table 3 
corresponds to the coefficient, βସ, from equation 1. It gives the treatment effect on the 
treated, i.e., the effect of the partial individualisation of the taxation system in Ireland on the 
labour supply of married women immediately after the reform. Panel A shows the effect of 
the reform when married women are compared to the control group of single women while 
Panel B shows the effect of the reform when married women are compared to the control 
group of married men. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Although the employment outcome is dichotomous, it is still advisable to use a linear probability model in 
this Difference-in-Differences setting rather than a logit or probit as comparisons of effects across groups are 
much more difficult with logit than with OLS. As the treatment effect is dichotomous in the Difference-in-
Differences model, interpreting its coefficient is not problematic even if a linear probability model is used. The 
interpretation of other coefficients on continuous variables in the model should, however, be treated with 
caution (Angrist, 2001). 
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Table 3 The effect of the individual taxation reform in Ireland in 2000 on employment 
and hours of work of married women  
            
            
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
A. Treatment group = married women. Control group = single 
women. 
Employment 
Treatment effect 0.04 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.025 0.185 0.189 
N 17,448 17,448 17,448 
Hours of work 
Treatment effect 1.26 2.11 ** 2.07 ** 
(1.07) (0.96) (0.96) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.048 0.223 0.225 
N 17,448 17,448 17,448 
B. Treatment group = married women. Control group = married 
men 
Employment 
Treatment effect 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.154 0.256 0.259 
N 22,231 22,231 22,231 
Hours of work 
Treatment effect 1.79 ** 1.77 ** 1.77 ** 
(0.79) (0.76) (0.76) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.293 0.357 0.358 
N 22,231 22,231 22,231 
            
Sample is aged between 20-60. The treatment effect is equivalent to β4 in 
equation 1. Marital status is self-defined. Extra controls include age, age 
squared, post-secondary qualification, no. of children, any children under 12 
and predicted wage. The time trend is a series of year dummies. Statistical 
significance is indicated by * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01" 
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The effect of the reform on employment probabilities is positive and statistically significant 
in all but one specification. Most estimates are in the region of 6 percentage points indicating 
that the employment probability of married women increased by 6 percentage points after the 
reform. This reflects the fact that, while the employment rate of married men and of single 
women was stable over the reform period, the employment rate of married women increased 
steeply around the reform period (see Figure 3).  
 
The effect of the reform on hours of work is also positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications but one. Married women are found to have increased their hours of work by 
around two per week after the reform. These estimates are similar regardless of the control 
group considered.  
 
Table 4 The effect of the individual taxation reform in Ireland in 2000 on hours of 
unpaid childcare performed by married women with children 
              
            
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
Treatment group = married women with children. Control group 
= married men with children. 
Employment 
Treatment effect -3.11 -3.23 * -3.24 * 
(1.98) (1.87) (1.87) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.3578 0.4285 0.4288 
N 15,122 15,122 15,122 
              
Sample is aged between 20-60. The treatment effect is equivalent to β4 in 
equation 1. Marital status is self-defined. Extra controls include age, age2 
squared, post-secondary qualification, no. of children, any children under 12 
and predicted wage. The time trend is a series of year dummies. Statistical 
significance is indicated by * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01" 
 
Table 4 shows the same results for a further outcome: hours of unpaid childcare performed by 
those with children. As discussed in the previous section, I consider just married men with 
children as a control group for this outcome variable as the group of single women with 
children does not have a similar pre-reform trend to the group of married women with 
children. I find that the hours of unpaid childcare performed by married women decreased, by 
around 3 per week, after the reform.  This magnitude is comparable to the estimated increase 
in hours of work by married women. 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
6.1 Alternative treatment and control group 
In this section, I re-estimate the Difference-in-Differences model outlined in equation 1 using 
an alternative treatment and control group. As women are typically the secondary earners in a 
couple, the results from the previous section compared their outcomes to those of married 
men or single women. In this section, I redefine the treatment group as the group of 
secondary earners. Secondary earner status is determined as follows. Wages are modelled for 
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all workers, with separate models run for males and females separately.11 Wages are then 
predicted for all individuals in the sample, whether they work or not. In this way, I create a 
“potential” wage variable for non-workers which can be used to determine if they are likely 
to be the primary or secondary earner in the couple. I discard couples in which potential 
earnings are similar for both members of the couple as, in these couples, it is not clear who 
the primary and secondary earner are. I define a primary earner as an individual whose 
predicted hourly wage rate is at least 1.2 times their spouse’s predicted hourly wage rate. A 
secondary earner is an individual whose predicted hourly wage is less than 0.8 times their 
spouse’s predicted hourly wage rate (see Table A1 for summary statistics relating to 
predicted wages and primary and secondary earner status). 12 Results from the Difference-in-
Differences model using these alternative treatment and control groups (available from author 
on request) are very similar to the baseline results. Employment probabilities of married 
women increase by 5-6 percentage points after the reform, hours of work of married women 
decrease by around 2 per week and hours of unpaid childcare of married women decrease by 
around 4 per week.  
  
6.2 Other policies 
As discussed in Section 4, Difference-in-Differences analysis assumes that there are no other 
reforms around the treatment period which might affect the outcomes of the treatment and 
control group differently. That is, any policy or other change that happened around the same 
time as the partial individualisation of the taxation system should not affect married women 
differently to single women or to married men. 
 
The late nineties and early noughties were years of strong economic growth and generous 
budgets in Ireland. Chief among the new measures was an increased level of transfers to 
working poor families with the Family Income Supplement increasing in 1998 and 2000. As 
well as the move to individualisation, income tax rates decreased in both the higher and lower 
brackets and an increased tax-free allowance was also introduced for all households. Perhaps 
the biggest policy change of the period, apart from the individualisation of taxation, was the 
introduction of a National Minimum Wage (NMW) of £4.40 in Ireland in April 2000. 
 
In Section 3, I show that the change in income tax rates and in tax free allowances had 
marginal incentive effects for secondary earners when compared to the individual tax reform. 
However, the increased FIS and the introduction of the NMW could plausibly have had 
different impacts on married women compared to single women or married men. This is 
because both the FIS and the NMW may have provided financial incentives for those with 
lower earnings potential (such as women) to join the labour market or to increase their labour 
supply. However, the magnitude of these effects is likely to be small. Bargain & Doorley 
(2011) show that the FIS policy in 2001 had virtually no effect on the labour supply of 
married women or married men.13  
 
 
                                                            
11 Further details of the wage model are given in the Appendix 
12 Changing these limits to 1.1 and 0.9 does not substantially alter results 
13 The FIS was found to slightly increase the labour supply of single women. The differential effect of the FIS 
on married women and single women works in the opposite direction to what we have found for the 
individualised taxation policy so, if anything, the findings relating to individual taxation with single women as 
the control group are lower bounds of the actual effect. 
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Table 5 The effect of the individual taxation reform in Ireland in 2000 on employment, 
hours of work and unpaid childcare hours of married women whose potential wage > €7 
per hour. 
              
            
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
A. Treatment group = married women. Control group = single 
women. 
Employment 
Treatment effect 0.08 ** 0.06 ** 0.06 * 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.04 0.18 0.18 
N 13497 13497 13497 
Hours of work 
Treatment effect 2.88 ** 2.29 ** 2.18 * 
(1.25) (1.16) (1.16) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.08 0.23 0.23 
N 13497 13497 13497 
B. Treatment group = married women. Control group = married men 
Employment 
Treatment effect 0.04 ** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.14 0.23 0.24 
N 20793 20793 20793 
Hours of work 
Treatment effect 1.06 1.46 * 1.48 ** 
(0.81) (0.77) (0.77) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.28 0.34 0.34 
N 20793 20793 20793 
Childcare hours 
Treatment effect -2.58 -3.26 * -3.28 * 
(2.02) (1.91) (1.91) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Time trend No No Yes 
R squared 0.36 0.43 0.43 
N 14274 14274 14274 
              
Sample is aged between 20-60 with a predicted hourly wage in excess of €7 
(£5.50) in 2000 prices. The treatment effect is equivalent to β4 in equation 1. 
Marital status is self-defined. Extra controls include age, age squared, post-
secondary qualification, no. of children, any children under 12 and predicted 
wage. The time trend is a series of year dummies. The treatment group for the 
childcare hours model is married women with children and the control group 
is married men with children. Statistical significance is indicated by * p<0.1 
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01" 
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As women tend to be overrepresented at the bottom of the wage distribution, the introduction 
of the NMW in 2000 increased the wages of low earning women by relatively more than the 
wages of low earning men (Bargain et al, 2016). This may have provided extra financial 
incentive for low earning women to join the labour market or to work more than low earning 
men. However, the Irish NMW has been found to have negligible employment effects 
(O’Neill et al, 2006) for either gender. To ensure that the effect that I identify is not partly 
related to the introduction of the NMW, I conduct a sensitivity analysis in which I restrict 
both the treatment and control samples to those individuals whose potential earnings are well 
above the level of the NMW. As the NMW was set at £4.40 (€5.60) in 2000, I restrict the 
sample to those with predicted hourly wages in excess of £5.50 (€7) in year 2000 prices. 
Results are displayed in Table 5. Panel A shows results for employment outcomes using 
single women as the control group while Panel B shows results for both employment 
outcomes and childcare using the control group of married men.14  
 
Employment effects are positive and statistically significant for this restricted group of 
married women with predicted wages well above the level of the minimum wage. 
Employment rates increase by 5-6 percentage points after the reform in the most flexible 
specifications while hours of work increase by 1-2 per week. These results are comparable to 
the baseline results in Tables 3 and 4. Hours of unpaid childcare decrease for married women 
and the magnitude of this change is also comparable to previous results at around 3 hours per 
week. These results suggest that any effect that the NMW may have had on employment or 
caring duties is not driving the results identified in this paper.   
7. Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the ability of tax policy to influence the labour market behaviour 
of women in Ireland. Exploiting the partial individualisation of the income taxation system in 
2000, which increased incentives for secondary earners to work, I show that the employment 
rate of married women increased by around 5-6 percentage points in response to the reform 
while average hours of work increased by around 2 per week. The magnitude of this effect is 
not statistically different from predictions of an employment increase of 2-3 percentage 
points made by Callan et al (2009) in an ex post analysis of a similar reform using Irish data 
from 1994. It is also well within the range of effects found in similar ex post studies in other 
countries. For example, Crossley & Jeon (2007) find that the labour force participation rate of 
married women increased by up to 10 percentage points in response to a similar reform in 
Canada while much of the 17 percentage point increase in the labour force participation of 
married women between 1969 and 1975 in Sweden was attributed to the introduction of 
individual taxation in 1971 (Selin, 2014). 
 
I also find evidence that the hours of unpaid childcare engaged in by married women 
decreases by around 3 per week in response to the reform. This could simply reflect the 
reduced time available to married women to take care of children, given that the opportunity 
cost of engaging in taxable work outside the home has changed relative to engaging in non-
taxable work inside the home. It could also indicate a change in bargaining power between 
the two spouses although the framework for analysis has assumed (based on graphical 
evidence) that there is no corresponding increase in the hours of childcare performed by men. 
 
                                                            
14 In the model for childcare hours the treatment group is married women with children and the control group is 
married men with children. Recall that, from Figure 3, it is apparent that single women with children do not 
have similar pre-treatment childcare trends to married women with children. 
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The European Commission’s Work-Life Balance Package strongly recommends removing 
fiscal disincentives for secondary earners, to support the work-life balance. Key among the 
measures proposed is complete individualisation of the income taxation system in countries 
where this is not already in place.15 In this paper, I have shown that the partial 
individualisation of the taxation system in 2000 did improve incentives to work for secondary 
earners and that this translated into increased labour force participation for this group. It is 
difficult, from this type of ex post study, to extrapolate the findings to more general situations 
which, in this case, could include the full individualisation of the income taxation system. An 
ex ante study of such a system using microsimulation in conjunction with a structural labour 
supply model could be used to further inform this debate. Other potentially important 
consequences of this policy reform such as its implications for the income distribution have 
not been discussed in this paper but could also be estimated using such a method.  
  
It is widely acknowledged that, for taxation reform to remove barriers to work for secondary 
earners, a package of accompanying measures to facilitate women who wish to combine 
family and professional life is also important. This ensures that removing barriers to work for 
secondary earners offers them a financially viable choice between working and engaging in 
home duties. These measures relate to affordable child and elderly care, parental leave for 
both parents and tax relief for employing domestic help. Recent initiatives in Ireland, such as 
the introduction of a Single Affordable Childcare Scheme, which provides both a means-
tested and a universal subsidy for childcare, represent a step in this direction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
15 Within Europe, just Sweden and Finland have fully individualised taxation systems. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Summary statistics for women and men in Ireland before and after the 
individual taxation reform in 2000  
          
Women Before After Difference   
Employed 0.50 0.58 0.08 *** 
Weekly hours of work (incl. zeros) 16.17 18.49 2.32 *** 
Weekly hours of childcare (incl. 
zeros) 35.18 30.72 -4.46 *** 
Part-time employment 0.18 0.21 0.03 *** 
Full-time employment 0.33 0.37 0.04 *** 
Age 38.66 39.71 1.05 *** 
Post-secondary qualification 0.32 0.35 0.03 *** 
No. of children 1.21 1.04 -0.17 *** 
Children under 12 (0/1) 0.43 0.39 -0.04 *** 
Hourly wage of workers 7.61 8.58 0.97 *** 
Predicted hourly wage for all 7.13 8.17 1.04 *** 
Married 0.68 0.67 -0.01 
Primary earner (married 
individuals) 0.04 0.03 -0.01 *** 
Secondary earner  (married 
individuals) 0.69 0.67 -0.02 *** 
Observations 13009 5424 
Men 
Employed 0.65 0.66 0.01 
Weekly hours of work (incl. zeros) 29.11 29.06 -0.05 
Weekly hours of childcare (incl. 
zeros) 3.74 3.72 -0.02  
Part-time employment 0.05 0.04 -0.01 *** 
Full-time employment 0.60 0.62 0.02 *** 
Age 36.62 37.52 0.9 *** 
Post-secondary qualification 0.26 0.28 0.02 *** 
No. of children 1.03 0.87 -0.16 *** 
Children under 12 (0/1) 0.35 0.31 -0.04 *** 
Hourly wage of workers 9.26 10.49 1.23 *** 
Predicted hourly wage for all 9.07 10.35 1.28 *** 
Married 0.60 0.60 0 
Primary earner (married 
individuals) 0.73 0.73 0  
Secondary earner (married 
individuals) 0.03 0.03 0  
Observations 15385 6324 
Sample is aged 20-60 and statistics are weighted using individual weights. The 
before period is years 1995-1999. The After period is years 2000-2001. Statistical 
significance is indicated by * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01" 
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Table A1 shows that the employment rate of women has increased by 8 percentage points 
between the pre-reform (1995-1999) and post-reform (2000-2001) period. This is 
accompanied by an increase in hours of work (2 per week) and a decrease in unpaid childcare 
(-4.5 per week).16 There have also been increases in the incidence of both part-time (defined 
as working fewer than 30 hours per week) and full-time work (defined as working 30 or more 
hours per week) among women. On average, the post-reform female sample is older. This is 
unsurprising given the rotating panel nature of the data. The female sample is more likely to 
have a post-secondary qualification, has fewer children and is less likely to have a child under 
12 years of age after the reform compared to before the reform.  
 
Real hourly wages for women increased by around £1 per hour between the pre-and post- 
reform period.17 Using the reported hourly wage for the sample of workers, I use a simple 
regression model to predict the hourly wage of the entire population in the sample and find 
that this has increased by a similar magnitude. 18 The probability of being married is 
unchanged for women in the sample between the pre- and post-reform periods. I define a 
primary and a secondary earner status variable for married individuals. A married individual 
is considered to be a secondary earner if the predicted hourly wage of the individual is less 
than 0.8 times the predicted hourly wage of their spouse. A married individual is considered 
to be a primary earner if the predicted hourly wage of the individual is more than 1.2 times 
the predicted hourly wage of their spouse. Most married women in the sample are potential 
secondary earners by this definition (almost 70%) compared to just 3% of married men. 
 
Men’s employment probability is much higher than women’s both before and after the reform 
but does not change over this period.  Hours of work and hours of childcare are also 
unchanged but there is a slight decrease in the incidence of part-time work and a slight 
increase in the incidence of full-time work. Like women, the men in the post-reform sample 
are older; more educated and have fewer children. The hourly wage of male workers 
increases over time, as does the predicted hourly wage for the whole sample. There is no 
change in the probability of marriage or in the likelihood of being a primary or secondary 
earner. 
 
 
                                                            
16 The variable “unpaid childcare hours” is derived from the following questions: Apart from a job or business, 
your daily activities may include other tasks such as looking after children. Do your present daily activities 
include looking after children (whether your own or someone else’s) without pay? Roughly how many hours per 
week would you spend looking after children? 
17 Real hourly wages are calculated by dividing the weekly wage by weekly hours and expressing the result in 
monetary terms for the year 2000 using Consumer Price Indices from the Central Statistics Office (CSO),  
18 Hourly wages are modelled as a function of age, detailed education categories, marital status, number of 
children and existence of children under 12 years of age and a time trend. This model is estimated by OLS for 
men and women separately and predictions for the entire working age population are then made. 
